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Social capital, a person or group’s sympathy or sense of obligation for another person or
group, assumes relationships can alter the terms of trade and the likelihood of trades between
individuals.  Other important economic consequences of social capital result from its ability to
internalize externalities.  This paper introduces social capital into the neoclassical model to derive
forecasts of how relationships will alter the minimum-sell prices of farmland and the likelihood of
trades between persons with different relationships.  Also deduced in this paper is the effect of
social capital on the level and dispersion of benefits from trade.  Empirical evidence from a 1,500
farmland owner-operator survey is analyzed and provides support for the social capital paradigm.SOCIAL CAPITAL, THE TERMS OF TRADE,
AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
Introduction
Social capital is defined by Robison, Schmid, and Siles (RSS) as:
. . . a person or group’s sympathy or sense of obligation for another person or group.
1
Alternative definitions of social capital are summarized in Woolcock.  RSS argue that the meaning
of social capital lacks precision because many of its proposed definitions include expressions of its
possible uses, where it resides, and how its service capacity can be changed.  Hence, these
definitions differ across disciplines and make interdisciplinary communication difficult.  The RSS
definition is an effort to describe social capital in a way that communicates across disciplines by
separating its definition from discussions of its uses, where it resides, and how its service capacity
can be changed.
Social capital in some ways is “old wine in a new bottle.”  The old idea is that social
relations can be a resource for or constraint on action.  Social capital is similar to “esprit de
corps,” a spirit of devotion and enthusiasm among members of a group for one another.  Veblen
referred to what we now identify as social capital as an intangible asset and Adam Smith
accurately described social capital in the following words:
Every man feels his own pleasures and his own pains more sensibly than those of
other people.  After himself, the members of his own family, those who usually
live in the same house with him, his parents, his children, his brothers and sisters,
are naturally the objects of his warmest affections.
Social capital introduces several changes into the standard economic analysis that assumes
symmetric and arm’s length social relationships.  First, social capital allows for sympathetic
(antipathetic) relationships that are not always symmetric.  Allowing sympathetic (antipathetic)
relationships that are not always symmetric redefines externalities.  An externality is created when
a consequence is imposed by one agent on another agent without due compensation.  An2
externality is internalized when the externality is experienced vicariously by the externality
creating agent.
A person or group of persons that is the object of another person or group of persons’
sympathy has social capital and can expect to receive preferential treatment because its
experiences are internalized by the social capital provider(s).  Sympathetic agents, social capital
providers, respond not only to their own incentives but also to the consequences of their actions
on other persons or group of persons who are the object of their sympathy.  Sympathetic agents
may create organizations and institutions that provide preferential treatment to others, but only
people experience sympathy and thus only people can provide social capital.
In the sections that follow, several important results are deduced from including social
capital in economic models, including the following.  A sympathetic agent will allocate resources
beyond his/her own profit maximizing output when there are benefits (costs) to the objects of
his/her sympathy.  An absence of social capital will lead an agent to behave as though his/her
preferences were selfish.  If social capital is strong enough to induce an agent to weigh his/her
own income and another agent’s equally, then the agent will allocate resources to maximize the
total income of both agents.  Finally, asymmetry in relationships creates exploitation opportunities
that may produce inefficient resource allocations.  For example, a “spoiled kid” employed by his
or her parents and who enjoys their sympathy may not be required to produce the same output as
nonrelated workers employed by the parents.  This capacity to produce inefficiencies in the
allocation and reward of productive factors is one of the interesting effects of social capital.
Another interesting aspect of social capital is that it possesses most of the capital-like properties
associated with other forms of capital, and therefore is capable of inclusion in a formal economic
model.
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What Social Capital Adds to the Economic Paradigm
The point of social capital is the following.  Agents rationally attempt to meet not only
economic and physical needs, but social ones as well.  These social needs include the need for
validation, the need to experience caring, and the need for knowledge of connections between
actions and physical and social outcomes.  Economic and physical needs are fulfilled by the
consumption of goods and services provided by physical, financial, and human capital.  Social
needs are fulfilled by consuming social services supplied by social capital that resides in
relationships.  Thus, the study of rational choice theory must consider not only physical, financial,
and human capital but also social capital because rational agents seek to satisfy both physical and
social needs.
While the traditional measures of profit and wealth may provide adequate proxies for
economic services in many traditional economic models, they contain no arguments that represent
an agent’s social needs, nor the mechanism through which these needs are satisfied.  Thus,
traditional profit and utility maximization models fail to account for social motives that often
substitute for, and sometimes complement, the pursuit of economic goals.
Perhaps one reason economists have failed to incorporate social goals into traditional
models is because including them can complicate mathematical results.  While some models such
as principle agent, transaction cost, club models, and altruism models may allow outcomes to
mimic those obtained from social capital models, they do so inadequately because they do not
recognize that social capital assets reside in relationships in which resources are invested and
disinvested, and that provide services valued by agents.
The paradigm of social capital offers an opportunity to cooperate with other social
sciences that recognize the importance of social relations.  What this cooperation requires is for4
economists to recognize that agents allocate their resources to achieve both economic and social
goals.  The social capital paradigm allows us to consider relationships as a form of capital that can
be used to achieve both economic and social goals.  It further enhances economic analysis by
recognizing that social capital, like other forms of capital, can be an endogenous variable that can
be changed through investment (disinvestment), maintenance, and use in ways consistent with
well-accepted maximization principles.
Modeling Social Capital
There are two ways to incorporate social capital into the neoclassical economic model.
One way is to assume that social needs are supplied by social services that are produced in a
social capital factory.  In this approach, to obtain more social capital services requires increased
social capital investments.  Here the challenge is to describe the social capital factory and the
connection between social capital (the factory) and the production of social capital services.
Another way to introduce social capital into the neoclassical economic model, the method
we follow here,  is to assume that people satisfy social needs through vicarious
experiences￿something like watching an engrossing movie in which the viewer becomes involved
with the actors, experiencing vicariously their successes and disappointments.  In this approach to
modeling social capital, agent i experiences another agent, j’s, well-being vicariously.  The
appropriate model would be one that includes j’s experiences, weighted by a social capital
coefficient describing the nature and the strength of i's relationship with j, directly into agent i’s
utility function.
When agent j is the object of agent i’s sympathy, then agent j has social capital and agent
j’s well-being appears in agent i’s utility function.  When agent i’s social capital services are5
supplied by his/her social capital that resides in agent j, then agent i may view investment in social
capital that resides with j as a means of increasing his/her supply of social capital services.
Complicating this entire process are the results accepted by many that social capital
substitutes for other kinds of capital and produces economic benefits as well as social capital
services.  For example, agent i may offer to agent j preferential terms of trade.  This offer may
have an effect on i’s financial well-being, may produce beneficial vicarious experiences, and may
increase both i and j’s social capital.
Finally, one could argue that vicarious experiences satisfy a need.  This argument has
some support from evidence that we choose the location and intensity of our vicarious
experiences.  For example, it is well known that winning football teams attract more fans than
losing ones.  One explanation is that the vicarious experience of watching one’s home team
succeed is more rewarding than watching a losing team.  Furthermore, we may often intensify our
experiences of watching a winning football team by wearing the school colors, cheering for the
home team, and other actions, all of which result in the home team’s increase in social capital.
In what follows, we intend to make some introductory steps in modeling the vicarious
experience associated with social capital.  Assume two economic agents i and j whose respective
incomes are    and    where    is a resource controlled by agent i with external %i(￿i) %j(￿i) ￿i
consequences for the income of agent j.  An example might be an agricultural producer whose
efforts to control pests on his own farm alter his neighbor’s pest population.  We also assume that
agent  j has social capital kij supplied by agent i.  For the moment, kij is considered to be
exogenous, such as might be the case if social capital were inherited or based on genealogy or
other conditions related to one’s birth.  For illustrative purposes, we assume i's utility function6
max
￿i
Ui [%i(￿i) ￿ kij%j(￿i)] (1)
depends on a linear combination of i and j's profits, with the weight on j's profit being determined
by the social capital coefficient kij.  Agent i's problem then becomes:
where   is any increasing and concave function,    and   are increasing and concave Ui[#] %i(￿i) %j(￿i)
in   , and   reaches a maximum value at  . ￿i %i(￿i) %i(¯ ￿i)
This preference specification is clearly restrictive because it requires social capital (and the
associated vicarious sensing) to enter the utility function in a very special (linear) way.  The linear
specification is used because it allows interesting results to be easily derived.  Many of the main
results in this paper follow through for a more general representation of preferences,
  , but the derivations are more complex.
3 Ui [%i(￿i),%j(￿i);kij]
We assume   .  Values of    imply agent i has more concern for how ￿1<kij <1 kij >1
his/her actions affect agent j’s income than how they affect his/her own income, which seems
unreasonable.  Values of    imply agent i would seek to reduce j’s income even if the cost to kij <1
himself/herself is greater than the loss to j, which also seems unreasonable.  Either attitude would
threaten agent i’s survival in the long run.
Many readers will note that equation (1) is similar to a standard altruism model with the
welfare of one agent depending on the welfare of another.  The difference here, however, is that
we characterize the vicarious sensing in terms of a social capital coefficient and examine what
happens to the use of   , terms of trade, and the distribution of income, as kij takes on different ￿i
values.7
C ￿ Ui [%i(￿i) ￿ kij%j(￿i)] or U
￿1




It should be clear in equation (1) that agent i’s choice of    has consequences for agent ￿i
j’s income.  Furthermore, equation (1) implies agent i’s utility function has the following
properties.  First, isoquants for equation (1) can be expressed as:
where C is a constant utility level.  Second, the slope of the isoquants of the model in income
space can be represented as:
Equation (3) implies that agent i would exchange income with agent j at the rate of   .  For 1
kij
  , this implies i would reduce his/her own income by one unit if it increased k’s income 0<kij <1
by   . 1
kij
The Influence of Social Capital on the Terms of Trade
Much of the recent empirical work in economics and social capital has to do with
demonstrating that social capital alters the terms of trade.  For the most part, these results show
that those with social capital receive preferential terms of trade.  What follows is a theoretical
model predicting that increases in social capital improve the likelihood of trade and the terms of
trade for social capital owners.
Assume agent i owns a resource represented by ￿ that he/she is considering selling to
agent j at a minimum-sell price of   .  The effect of the resource transfer on i and j’s profits can p
s
ij
be expressed as    and   , ￿￿%i(￿) ￿ %i(￿i) ￿ %i ￿i ￿ ￿ <0 ￿%j(￿) ￿ %j ￿j ￿ ￿ ￿ %j ￿j >08
%i ￿i ￿ ￿ ￿ kij %j(￿j) ￿ %i ￿i ￿ p
s















(1 ￿ kij)2 (6)
respectively, where ￿i (￿j) represents agent i’s (j’s) resource base without ￿ included.  Agent i’s
minimum-sell price is a price that leaves him/her on the same iso utility line before and after the
sale.  This can be written using ￿ as:
Solving for agent i’s minimum-sell price as a function of kij, we obtain:
If agent j’s social capital is zero, agent i’s minimum-sell price offered to agent j,  p
s
ij
equals his/her opportunity cost of selling the asset,   .  If agent j has social capital, then ￿%i(￿)
agent i’s minimum-sell price to j is unlikely to equal his/her opportunity cost of   .  To ￿%i(￿)
determine how agent j’s social capital alters agent i’s minimum-sell price, we differentiate to
obtain the effect of a change in social capital on the minimum-sell price.  The result is:
Note that the qualitative effect of a change in social capital on the minimum-sell price for
   depends on the sign of the numerator in equation (6).  The sign of the numerator in equation kij
(6) equals the difference in agent i and agent j’s opportunity cost of using the asset ￿.  If
  , we say agent j has a comparative advantage (disadvantage) in the ￿%i(￿) ￿ ￿%j(￿)< 0 ( > 0 )9
use of ￿ and an increase in social capital reduces (increases) agent i’s minimum-sell price to agent
j.
Equations (5) and  (6) imply the following results which are summarized in Figures 1 and
2 and Table 1.
In Figure 1, agent i has a comparative advantage in the use of the asset.  If agent j enjoys
agent i’s sympathy (antipathy), then agent i will charge agent j a price above (below) his or her
own opportunity cost,   , to discourage (encourage) agent j’s purchase.  In Figure 2, agent j ￿%i(￿)
has a comparative advantage in the use of the asset.  If agent j enjoys agent i’s sympathy
(antipathy), then agent i will charge agent j a price below (above) his or her own opportunity cost,
  , to encourage (discourage) agent j’s purchase.  If kij is zero (no social capital), then i’s ￿%i(￿)
minimum-sell price is his/her opportunity cost    regardless of the comparative advantage ￿%i (￿)
of agent j to agent i.
The results of Figures 1 and 2 are also described in Table 1 and the likelihood of a sale is
discussed.  A necessary condition for a sale to occur when    is   ; i.e., when kji ￿ 0 p
s
ij < ￿%j (￿)
agent j faces a minimum-sell price below his or her own gains from trade.
The middle row in Table 1 needs little explanation; the minimum-sell price equals agent  i's
opportunity cost when the prospective buyer is a stranger and the sale depends on the buyer
having a comparative advantage equal to or exceeding that of the seller in the use of the resource.
The first row considers the likelihood of a sale to a friend.  In this model, the seller recognizes
that total income would be reduced, remain the same, or be increased by the sale to a friend
depending on the comparative advantage of the buyer.  A sale is likely only when j has the















encourage the sale.  A sale is unlikely when agent i holds the comparative advantage because
agent i’s minimum-sell price is always above agent j’s opportunity cost.
The last row considers the sale of the asset to an enemy.  In this case, utility of the seller
may be increased if the income of the buyer is reduced by his/her paying a price    greater than p
s
ij
his or her opportunity cost   .  Thus, the seller offers a discount when holding a ￿%j (￿)
comparative advantage and a premium when holding a comparative advantage.  However, only
when the buyer holds a comparative advantage is a sale likely and even then may not occur if
agent j can purchase the same resource from a stranger or a friend.
The conclusion is that the sale of  “￿” is unlikely to occur when the seller has antipathy
toward the buyer, even when the buyer has an arm’s length relationship toward the seller.  In
addition, sales are likely to occur between friends and strangers only when the buyer has a
comparative advantage in the use of the asset.
From agent j’s perspective, we might consider his/her maximum-bid price,   , to also be p
b
ji
a function of social capital; in this case agent i’s social capital is kji.  In such a model, we could
easily deduce a maximum-bid price equal to:
and:





Figure 1. Agent i’s Minimum-Sell Price pij as a Function of kij When He/She Has a Comparative






Figure 2. Agent i’s Minimum-Sell Price pij  as a Function of kij When Agent j Has a Comparative












(agent i has comparative
advantage)
￿%i (￿) ￿ ￿%j (￿)
(neither i nor j have
comparative advantage)
￿%i (￿)<￿%j (￿)
(agent i has comparative
advantage)
   kij >0 ￿%j (￿)<￿%i(￿)<p
s
ij
Agent i offers “￿” for sale
to a friend at his/her
opportunity cost plus a
premium and a sale is
unlikely.
 ￿%j (￿)￿ ￿%i(￿)￿ p
s
ij
Agent i offers “￿” for sale
to a friend at his/her
opportunity cost.  Agent j is
indifferent about the





Agent i offers “￿” for sale
to a friend at his/her
opportunity cost less a
discount.  Agent j is facing
a price below his/her
opportunity cost and a sale
is likely.
   kij ￿ 0 ￿%j (￿)<￿%i(￿)￿ p
s
ij
Agent i offers “￿” for sale
to a stranger at his/her
opportunity cost.  Agent j
is facing a price above
his/her opportunity cost
and a sale is unlikely.
 ￿%j (￿)￿ ￿%i(￿)￿ p
s
ij
Agent i offers “￿” for sale
to a stranger at his/her
opportunity cost.  Agent j is
indifferent about the





Agent i offers “￿” for sale
to a stranger at his/her
opportunity cost.  Agent j
faces a price below his/her
opportunity cost and a sale
is likely.
   kij <0 ￿%j (￿)<p
s
ij< ￿%i(￿)
Agent i offers “￿” for sale
to an enemy at his/her
opportunity cost less a
discount.  Agent j faces a
price above his/her
opportunity cost and a sale
is unlikely.
 ￿%j (￿)￿ ￿%i(￿)￿ p
s
ij
Agent i offers “￿” for sale
to an enemy at his/her
opportunity cost.  Agent j is
indifferent about the





Agent i offers “￿” for sale
to an enemy at his/her
opportunity cost plus a
premium.  Agent j faces a
price below his/her
opportunity cost but likely
above the purchase price
offered by another agent
with the identical asset but
who does not consider j to















0 ￿%j (￿) ￿ ￿%i (￿)
>0 (10a)
In addition, a table similar to Table 1 could be created to describe terms of trade offered
by the buyer.  The conclusions would be comparable with those derived for Table 1.  Buyers are
unlikely to purchase from their enemies and will purchase from their friends and strangers only
when they (the buyers) have a comparative advantage.
We next examine the conditions under which trades are likely to occur when buyer and
seller both own (lack) social capital.  To make the analysis manageable, we assume social capital
symmetry; i.e.,    = k.  Symmetry is a reasonable assumption since asymmetry would kij ￿ kji
permit exploitation that might lead to changes in the social capital provided by the exploited agent
until   .   Symmetry in social capital coefficients might therefore be viewed as a long-run kij ￿ kji
equilibrium condition.
Trades occur when the maximum-bid price is greater than or equal to the minimum-sell










distribution as a result of trade.  As the surplus increases, the greater is the benefit from trade.
The surplus equation can be expressed as:
Clearly, the surplus increases with  j’s comparative advantage, and also increases as social









There is no trade surplus when the comparative advantage associated with the use of ￿ remains
with agent i.  Furthermore, the surplus diminishes even if j has comparative advantage if   . k <0
An important conclusion emerges from these results; namely, that increases in social capital lead
to higher surpluses and increase the likelihood of trades when the buyer has a comparative
advantage.  For agents lacking social capital, surpluses only arise from relative differences in
comparative advantages.
Empirical Tests of the Importance of Social Capital in Land Transactions
Fifteen hundred farm owner-operators located in Illinois, Michigan, and Nebraska were
surveyed to determine the influence of relationships on the selection of trading partners and terms
of trade for farmland exchanges.  Those surveyed were selected by random sampling techniques
designed to sample across the geographic distribution of farmland in each state.  The survey
method followed that recommended by Dillman including a pre-survey post card describing the
survey and its purpose to respondents, mailing the survey, following the survey mailing with a
post card encouraging the respondents to mail in their questionnaires, and a second mailing of
questionnaires to non-respondents.
Approximately 604 usable questionnaires were returned representing a 40 percent
response rate.  The response rates by state were 38.8 percent, 48.6 percent, and 33.4 percent for
Illinois, Michigan, and Nebraska, respectively.  Qualifying the respondents for the survey were
ownership of farmland and experience buying and selling farmland.  Respondents reported that15
82.2 percent, 88.7 percent, and 89.0 percent in Illinois, Michigan, and Nebraska, respectively, had
sold farmland.  Respondents also reported that 30.4 percent, 24.3 percent, and 24.6 percent in
Illinois, Michigan, and Nebraska, respectively, had sold land.
Respondents on average were 57 years old, supported 1.96 dependents financially, and
belonged to 1.31 organizations including parent-teacher organizations or school boards, church
organizations, service clubs, local government organizations, or environmental organizations.
The highest level of educational achievement for over half of those surveyed, 54 percent, was a
high school degree.  Nearly one-quarter of those surveyed had completed a college degree or
graduate degree.  Forty-three percent of those surveyed had after-tax household income of less
than $30,000.  Over 8 percent of the population earned after-tax household income of $70,000 or
more.  Other details of the survey can be found in Siles et al.
The first goal of the survey was to establish a benchmark land price not influenced by
relationships against which prices influenced by social capital could be measured.  So, the
questionnaire began by describing farmland for sale with the following characteristics: (1) The
farmland is average quality non-irrigated crop land and is being offered for sale in either 20-, 40-,
or 80-acre units.  There are no buildings or other improvements on the land.  (2) The farmland is
located in the buyer's area near serviceable roads and within 5 miles of a town of nearly 5,000
persons.  The land is not considered to have residential site value.  (3) The buyer intends to use
the land for farming and will provide his/her own financing.  (4) The seller will pay 5 percent of
the farmland sale price for commissions and other legal fees associated with the sale.  (5) Payment
for the sale of the land will be provided by the buyer to the seller in the form of a cashier’s check
at the time of sale closing.  (6) The land being sold is not adjacent to where the seller lives.
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To establish the base price against which other prices could be compared, respondents
were asked the value professional appraisers and tax assessors would estimate the land to be
worth.  Then, they were asked to list the lowest price they would accept from a complete stranger
who intends to farm the land and whose agent would arrange for and guarantee that the terms of
the sale were fulfilled.  The values expected to be placed on the land by professional appraisers
and tax assessors and respondents’ minimum-sell price to a stranger are reported in Table 2.
Table 2. Average Land Values Estimated by Professional Appraisers, Tax Assessors, and a
Seller’s Minimum-Sell Price to a Stranger














































Farmland was valued higher in Illinois than either Michigan or Nebraska.  In addition, the
minimum-sell price to strangers was higher in all three states than the value respondents expected
that professional appraisers or tax assessors would place on the land.  Finally, respondents on
average expected that professional appraisers would value farmland more than tax assessors.
The main part of this study asked respondents to assume they were selling their land and a
complete stranger had offered them the price they wrote down earlier, their minimum-sell price to
a stranger.  Then, the respondents were asked to assume that several other potential buyers17
approached them with an offer to buy their land.  Finally, the respondents were asked to indicate
their minimum-sell price to a friendly neighbor, an unfriendly neighbor, an influential person in
their community, and a friendly relative.  The responses to these hypothetical offers are reported
in Table 3.
Table  3. Average Minimum-Sell Prices When the Buyer Is a Friendly Neighbor,  an
Unfriendly Neighbor, an Influential Person, or a Friendly Relative





























































The average minimum-sell prices are reported by respondents from Illinois, Michigan, and
Nebraska.  Respondents would accept the lowest price from their friendly relatives, $1,664.77.
They would accept a similar price from their friendly neighbors, $1,686.45.  The minimum-sell
price to an influential person was greater than the minimum-sell price to a stranger, $1,876.63.  In
contrast, the highest minimum-sell price, reported respondents, would be required of unfriendly
neighbors, $2,114.81￿making it unlikely for the sellers to complete a sale to an unfriendly
neighbor.18
To determine the role of relationships on the selection of trading partners, survey
respondents were asked their relationship to persons from whom they had purchased or to whom
they had sold land.  The results are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4. The Percentage of Farmland Sales to Buyers Who the Seller Viewed as a Friendly
(Unfriendly) Neighbor, a Complete Stranger, a Relative, Influential Person, or a
Legal Entity
The farmland sellers viewed





























































Percent 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
TOTAL 53 65 46 16419
Table 5. The Percentage of Farmland Purchases from Sellers Who the Buyer Viewed as a
Friendly (Unfriendly) Neighbor, Complete Stranger, Relative, Influential Person,
or Legal Entity
The farmland buyer viewed the





























































Percent 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
TOTAL 164 234 161 559
Thirty-two percent of the purchases and 39 percent of the sales were to friendly neighbors.
On the other hand, only 2 percent of purchases and 2 percent of sales were to unfriendly
neighbors.  Unfortunately, we do not know what percent of the potential land buyers and sellers
were considered to be friendly or unfriendly neighbors.  However, we expect most potential
buyers and sellers are known persons.
The survey respondents appeared much more willing to sell land to a stranger, 38 percent,
than to buy their land from a stranger, 17 percent.  Finally, relatives were a significant percent of20
both the buyers, 20 percent, and sellers, 29 percent.  Legal entities and influential persons
accounted for only 7 percent of the purchases and 13 percent of the sales of farmland.
The results of this portion of the survey led us not to reject our maintained hypothesis that
social capital increases the likelihood of trade since 52 percent of the sales and 67 percent of the
sales were between friends and family.
Table 6 is the key empirical support for this study.  It represents the paired sample t-tests
of differences in minimum-sell prices to selected buyers.  The mean differences and t-tests are
reported for each pair of potential buyers.  The most significant difference was between unfriendly
neighbors and friendly relatives, $445.47.  The smallest difference between minimum-sell prices
was between friendly neighbors and friendly relatives, $23.67.  Important to notice, however, was
that in all cases there was a significant difference between the minimum-sell price offered a
stranger and the price offered to friendly neighbors and family, unfriendly neighbors, and
influential persons.
The results of Table 6 are illustrated graphically in Figure 3.  Figure 3 provides a
percentage metric describing the influence of social capital on minimum-sell prices.21
Table  6. Three-State (Illinois, Michigan, and Nebraska) Paired Sample t-Tests of
























































Figure 3.  Premiums (Discounts) that Depend on Buyer’s Relationship to the Seller or the
 Buyer’s Social Capital with the Seller23








￿ [￿i] ￿ 0 (11)
Social Capital and Income Distributions
Perhaps the most significant result of introducing social capital into the neoclassical model
that reflects selfishness of preferences is that externalities may be internalized depending on the
distribution of social capital.  Furthermore, internalizing externalities has the effect of altering
terms of trade for agents who own social capital.  The theoretical and empirical results of the
previous section address this point.
In this section, a second implication of internalizing externalities is explored; how changes
in social capital change the distribution of income.  We expect a connection between changes in
social capital and changes in income distribution for the following reasons.  If changes in social
capital alter the terms of trade and terms of trade alter income distributions, then changes in social
capital must alter income distributions.  What follows explores this important issue.
A social capital utility function for agent i with desirable properties was described in
equation (1).  The utility maximizing solution for    in the simplified utility function can be ￿i
written as:













































totally differentiating the first-order condition and setting it to zero obtains the result that:
and:
Equation (13) states that when increases in    increase (decrease, have no effect on) j’s ￿i
profit, then increases in kij increase (decrease or have no effect on) i’s allocation of   .  Stated ￿i





in the next section.
Increases in Social Capital and Changes in Income Distributions
Consider the economic consequences on the sum of agent i’s and j’s income and the
difference in their incomes as j’s social capital that resides with agent i is increased.
The total incomes of agents i and j are equal to   .  Maximizing   %T ￿ %i(￿i) ￿ %j (￿i) %T




















Assume that agent i has chosen his/her utility maximizing level of ￿, namely ￿*.  Next,
consider the effect on ￿* of an increase in kij.  As j’s social capital increases, the effect on total
income can be expressed as:












(15) we describe three possible external consequences of agent i’s choice of ￿ on agent j.  These
possible externalities are described in Table 7.
From Table 7, we deduce that increases in social capital increase total income whenever
i’s actions produce external consequences for agent j.  This important result suggests that income
policies must pay attention to investments in social capital as well as other forms of capital.
Increases in Social Capital and Changes in Income Differences
Next, consider the effect of an increase in social capital on the difference between    and %i
   measured as the square of income differences: %j26
d%D
dkij








%D ￿ %i￿ %j
2 (16)
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As j’s social capital increases, the effect on    can be found by differentiating equation (16) to: %D
obtain:
The sign of equation (17) can be established with the aid of Table 8 and earlier derived
results.  The essence of the results in Table 8 is that increases in social capital reduce (increase)
differences in income when agent j has less (more) income than agent i.27
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In a recently published study, Robison and Siles use U.S. Census data for 1980 and 1990
to test for influences of social capital on income distributions by states.  To measure social capital,
they collected data on non-economic social indicator variables that are generally accepted
measures of social capital.  These social capital indicator variables were grouped into four
categories:  family integrity variables, educational achievement variables, litigation variables, and
labor force participation variables.  Their studies provided support for the deductions made in this
paper that under fairly general conditions, increases in social capital among members of a social
capital defined network reduce income disparity and increase average income by internalizing
what otherwise would be considered to be externalities.
Conclusions
Including social capital in the neoclassical utility maximizing model allows us to model the
important effects relationships of sympathy (antipathy) have on terms of trade and likelihood of28
trades.  The capital-like properties of social capital have been described elsewhere.  The important
point is that these capital-like properties allow economists to model social capital much like they
might model the economic consequences of other forms of capital.
What social capital provides are social services of value, much like physical, human, and
financial capital provide economic services of value.  Since social services may complement or
substitute for financial services, their effects cannot be modeled in isolation without imposing
seriously limiting assumptions.  Thus, the interdependent nature of social and economic services in
utility maximizing models suggests significant opportunities for cooperation between economists
and other social sciences.
An empirical effort was made and reported in this paper to test the implications on terms
of trade and likelihood of trades deduced from a simplified social capital model.  The empirical
results supported the deductions reached in the social capital model￿namely, that increases in
social capital improve the likelihood of trades between friends and family when the buyer has a
comparative advantage in the use of the traded asset.
Additional deductions showed that increases in social capital have important and
predictable consequences on the income distribution of social capital rich networks￿increases in
social capital increase the average income and reduce income differences.  Empirical support for
the linkages between changes in income distributions and changes in the distribution of income
was reported elsewhere.
In conclusion, social capital offers economists a new tool.  It redefines externalities,
broadens the definition of what is considered rational behavior, recognizes an important resource
whose management offers new policy options, and suggests the need for increased cooperation
with other social sciences.  As agricultural economists’ roles are changing and the demand for29
their services is altered, it just well may be that including social capital in our traditional models
may demonstrate our usefulness and increase our connectedness to meet the challenges of an
increasingly complex world.
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1. Sympathy as used here is consistent with the definition found in Webster’s Ninth Collegiate
Dictionary; namely, sympathy is an affinity, association, or relationship between persons or things
wherein whatever affects one similarly affects the other.
2. See RSS and Prichell for a discussion of this point.
3. The social capital model could be further generalized by including social capital coefficients  kji
and   .  See Robison and Schmid for a discussion of the motivation for including these additional kii
arguments.  See also Robison and Hanson for application of the generalized model.
4. For a complete report of the land value survey, see Siles, Robison, B.J. ???
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